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Joint Bidding in Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study of Policy Design and Performance 
In designing conservation policies both ecolo-
gists and economists have argued that greater 
spatial coordination of producer land use adop-
tion can improve environmental outcomes for a 
range of important environmental targets such as 
wetlands restoration, nutrient pollution reduction, 
and species conservation. Economists have sug-
gested two types of incentive policies for achiev-
ing such spatial coordination: the Agglomeration 
Bonus (AB) (Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007) and 
spatially-connected auctions (Banerjee et al., 
2015). However, a majority of the analyses to 
date have focused on incentives aimed at indi-
vidual land manager participation in such 
schemes (e.g., Fooks et al., 2016). In contrast, a 
number of countries such as the UK and the 
Netherlands have recently introduced policies 
that encourage joint participation by groups of 
producers. Thus, in this research, we study 
whether joint participation can in fact lead to im-
proved environmental and economic outcomes in 
conservation policies.  
For this purpose, we design and analyze behav-
ior in a conservation auction using a laboratory 
economic experiment. In these experiments, 
auction participants make a repeated set of bid-
ding decisions based on which they get paid. In 
keeping with reality where joint bidding auctions 
are  
uncommon, we consider an experimental 
treatment condition in which participants 
submit both individual and joint bids while 
participating in the conservation auction 
and a baseline control condition in which 
only individual bid submissions are possi-
ble. Since bidding in these conservation 
auctions can be a cognitively complex 
activity (Banerjee and Conte 2018), we 
also consider a second treatment dimen-
sion where in some sessions bidders can 
revise and resubmit their bids and others 
in which they cannot. Additionally, given 
the need for greater coordination and the 
fact that in reality producers routinely ex-
change information about various as-
pects of their operation with their peers, 
during the experiment participants are 
permitted to communicate with their 
neighbors. The focus on neighbors is key 
as it imparts a spatial dimension to the 
economic decision environment of the 
experiment. Specifically, individuals in the 
experiment are arranged on a circular 
landscape with every participant having 
two neighbors with whom they communi-
cate about all aspects of the bidding ex-
ercise prior to submitting bids. 
In keeping with the conservation policy literature 
where spatial coordination is incentivized and re-
warded with bonus payments if neighboring pro-
ducers are able to coordinate their land-use deci-
sions, this study considers such bonus payments 
as well. However, since preparation and submis-
sion of joint bids is a time-consuming activity in-
volving deliberation with neighbors much more so 
than for individual bids, the bonuses rewarded for 
the successful joint bids are greater than those for 
individual bids. Specifically, we consider two con-
ditions where the joint bid bonus is 2.5 and 1.5 
times the bonus for individual neighboring bids 
and a third condition where the joint bonus is still 
at 1.5 the individual bonus value and there is no 
bonus for selected neighboring individual bids. 
Given this setup, Table 1 represents the different 
experimental treatments considered for this study 
and the data collected.   
During the experiments, participants in groups of 
8 people submitted bids for their items, in 9 auc-
tions. Each auction varied in terms of the cost of 
land use practice and environmental benefits gen-
erated for the items. At all times during the bidding 
exercise, participants had access to this cost and 
quality information about their own item, but not 
for others.
1 
By referring to land-use practices as 
items and thus introducing no environmental con-
text into our experiments, we ensure that all be-




experimental analysis are owing to pure eco-
nomic incentives. 
2 
During an auction, 
neighboring bidders communicated with each 
other and submitted bids which were then 
evaluated by the computer to obtain the win-
ners. This winner information was provided to 
participants after which the next auction be-
gan. Such information feedback in real-time is 
valuable in generating learning opportunities 
for experimental participants which are again 
a reflection of what happens in practice with 
producers learning and adjusting their bid 
submissions over the repeated implementa-
tion of conservation policies such as the Con-
servation Reserve Program. 
Results 
The goal of this research is to evaluate the 
impact of joint bidding on auction outcomes in 
terms of environmental benefits produced and 
economic cost-effectiveness achieved. For 
this purpose, we look at the (i) cost-
effectiveness of the auction defined by a com-
posite metric termed POCER developed by 
Cason et al. (2003) (ii) the total level of ag-
glomeration measured as the number of 
shared borders between selected items and 
(iii) total benefits generated in the auction 
from selected items (noting that if items are 
selected from neighbors, spatial benefits are 
generated),. Figures 1, 2, and 3 present some 
key results in terms of the average values for 
these performance metrics for each treatment 
for auctions organized by if bid revision is al-
lowed and when it is not.  
 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1Bidders could always get to know about others’ cost and quality values via communication. 
2Context loaded economic experiments are common and could be a subject matter for future research.  























Figure 3:  Average Environmental Benefit 
 
The figures indicate that across most treat-
ments, the auction generates a high level of 
cost-effectiveness (Figure 1) regardless of 
treatment indicating that conservation auc-
tions can be an economically efficient way to 
generate environmental benefits. We see 
higher levels of agglomeration (Figure 2) 
when only joint bidding is rewarded with a bo-
nus payment as opposed to other treatments 
where bonuses are available for individual ad-
jacent bids as well. Such high levels of ag-
glomeration also generate higher benefits un-
der this condition (Figure 3).  
 
Statistical testing with non-parametric Wil-
coxon tests suggests that relative to individual 
bidding auctions, joint bidding auctions that 
pay bonuses for both individual and joint bids 
either leave environmental benefits and ag-
glomeration rates unchanged or lower them. 
Realized performance depends upon the size 
of the bonus for joint bids and bid revision op-
portunities. In the auction treatments where 
revision and resubmission are not possible, 
environmental benefits and cost-effectiveness 
are significantly lower for the generous (γ=2.5) 
joint-bidding bonus condition than for individ-
ual-only bidding.  However, this is the case 
where both individual and joint bids can gen-
erate bonus payments for adjacent winning 
bidders. When only bonuses for joint bids are 
possible, benefits generated are significantly 
higher – since joint bids are more difficult to 
prepare, bidders are willing to take on this ex-
tra effort only if it is rewarded with a bonus 
while individual bidding is not.  
However, transaction costs are rarely (if ever) 
low and conservation budgets are usually 
tight. In this case, an auction that does not al-
low for bid revision with a less generous bo-
nus payment for joint bids may be more suit-
able.  
Finally, if the agency were to eliminate the bonus 
for adjacent individual bids, the results suggest 
that economic and environmental performance 
moves in opposite directions. Cost-effectiveness is 
significantly lower with joint bidding, but environ-
mental performance improves. Herein is again a 
situation where broader policy goals beyond those 
directly associated with auction implementation 
may guide auction design choices.  
Conclusion 
This study is one of the few studies to focus on 
studying the impact of joint bidding on conserva-
tion auction performance. Our results indicate that 
the nature of incentives associated with rewarding 
spatial coordination in the first place will influence 
the environmental effectiveness and economic ef-
ficiency of conservation auction-based policies 
with joint bidding. A few caveats are in order. This 
study is a context-neutral laboratory experiment 
with university students and provides evidence re-
garding the internal theoretical validity of the 
mechanism being studied. However, the findings 
will require further testing both in controlled and 
context-rich settings with producer participants be-
fore any policy recommendations with the fullest 
degree of confidence can be made. But in the 
meantime, the results of the study provide some 
valuable insights which can guide further experi-
mentation and policy recommendations.  
 
This study is forthcoming in the Journal of the As-
sociation of Environmental and Resource Econo-
mists.  
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